Abstract:
Hallucination has been widely recognized to be a significant drawback for large language models (LLMs). There have been many works that attempt to reduce the extent of hallucination. These efforts have mostly been empirical so far, which cannot answer the fundamental question whether it can be completely eliminated. In this paper, we formalize the problem and show that it is impossible to eliminate hallucination in LLMs. Specifically, we define a formal world where hallucina- tion is defined as inconsistencies between a computable LLM and a computable ground truth function. By employing results from learning theory, we show that LLMs cannot learn all of the computable functions and will therefore always hal- lucinate. Since the formal world is a part of the real world which is much more complicated, hallucinations are also inevitable for real world LLMs. Furthermore, for real world LLMs constrained by provable time complexity, we describe the hallucination-prone tasks and empirically validate our claims. Finally, using the formal world framework, we discuss the possible mechanisms and efficacies of existing hallucination mitigators as well as the practical implications on the safe deployment of LLMs.
How do you propose to get these independent LLMs? If both are trained using similar objectives e.g., masked token prediction, then they won’t be independent.
Also, assuming independent LLMs could be obtained, how do you propose to compute this hallucination probability? Without knowing this probability, you can’t know how many verification LLMs are sufficient for your application, can you?
There are already existing multiple different LLMs that are essentially completely different. In fact this is one of the major problems with LLMs, because when you add even a small amount of change into an LLM it turns out to radically alter the output it returns for huge amounts of seemingly unrelated topics.
For your other point, I never said bouncing their answers back and forth for verification was trivial, but it’s definitely doable.
Can you provide the source of a few of these completely different LLMs?
You mean perturbing the parameters of the LLM? That’s hardly surprising IMO. And I’m not sure it’s convincing enough to show independence, unless you have a source for this?
Do you mean that small changes radically change the phrasing of answers, but that it has largely the same “knowledge” of the world? Or do you mean that small changes also radically alter what a llm thinks is true or not? If you think the former is true, then these models should still be the same in regards to what they think is true or not, and if you don’t then you think that llms perception of the world is basically arbitrary and in that case we shouldn’t trust them to tell us what’s true at all.