- cross-posted to:
- ukrainianconflict@lemmit.online
- cross-posted to:
- ukrainianconflict@lemmit.online
Opinion piece by professor of political science Alexander J. Motyl.
A synopsis of sorts from the first few paragraphs:
Analysts of Russia differ about many things, but the most important difference concerns their interpretation of the roots of Russia’s ongoing aggression. One side argues that Russian history and political culture are to blame — or, to put it more simply, uniquely Russian characteristics are the cause of Russian aggression. The other side argues that the causes are not uniquely Russian, but typical of the behavior of certain kinds of states, regimes, societies and leaders.
Unsurprisingly, historians of Russia and Ukraine tend to fall into the first camp, while political scientists with a comparative bent tend to fall into the second camp. Equally unsurprisingly, the first camp sees no easy solutions to Russia’s current behavior, precisely because it’s just a continuation of an age-old pattern of Russian behavior inspired by the inalterable Russian soul.
[…]
In contrast, social scientists are often somewhat more bullish about Russia’s prospects of change. Other countries have abandoned centuries of authoritarianism, so why not Russia? It may not be easy, but it’s surely possible, with the right array of policies and under the appropriate conditions.
[…]
So, who’s right? Alas, both perspectives are, and that’s why there is no easy answer to the problem of Russian imperialism.
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The other side argues that the causes are not uniquely Russian, but typical of the behavior of certain kinds of states, regimes, societies and leaders.
The likelihood of imperialism persisting in Russian minds and politics therefore means that, unless the West is willing to pursue total victory, it will have to settle for second best: containment.
Russia’s neighbors — the former Soviet non-Russian republics — would have to be armed militarily and supported economically to serve as an effective cordon sanitaire.
The solution is simple to imagine, but, given the West’s reluctance to expend resources on foreign policy entanglements, it will have to prioritize and devote its efforts to the countries that matter most to its own security and survival: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, which will have to be weaned off Russia after its authoritarian president, Alexander Lukashenko, leaves politics.
Perhaps taking his cue from Leonid Brezhnev’s mismanagement of the Soviet Union, Putin is rapidly transforming Russia into an unviable state, society and economy, thereby undermining its capacity to expand and win wars.
That may be the most stable solution to the Russian imperialist drive: Mother Russia’s self-transformation into a loud-mouthed banana republic with delusions of grandeur.
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