• 10 Posts
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Joined 3 years ago
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Cake day: June 23rd, 2023

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  • Yea, well that was my first though, but then I though - why would chrome even allow any website to just arbitrary check which extensions you have installed.

    So I checked the scripts and at this line the script is showing

    async function fetchExtensionInfo(extensionId) {
      return new Promise((resolve) => {
        const url = `https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/$%7BextensionId%7D`;
    

    So I thought maybe they were calling the chromewebstore foreach plugin, and if you have an extension already installed, you get a different response than when you don’t - or something.

    But I suppose I’m wrong and for some reason a site can just ask the browser internally which plugins are installed



  • I don’t think this has been mentioned, but it kind of depends on where your multiple laptops / desktops are. Is this always on your own home network? Because in that case you don’t even need a remote service like Github

    If so, you can create a network drive on any of the devices - mount the network device on your other devices, and then create a local git repo there. Just remember that using an external git service is also a backup. So if you do everything locally, make sure to have your own backups in place

    A much, much worse but also possible solution is to just put your projects into onedrive/dropbox/gdrive and sync it everywhere. It works for syncing, since you’re saying that’s the main objective - but you lose out on version control


  • However, what is stopping a malicious actor from bypassing the API gateway and communicating directly to the micro services ? Do we solve this problem using a firewall, so only trusted traffic reaches the micro services ?

    Kind of - sort of

    With this kind of setup, usually you’d put all your micro services inside a VPC. The micro services wouldn’t even be directly accessible from the internet. So it wouldn’t really be a “firewall” - but a nat gateway.

    Though conceptually a little bit the same. The API gateway is kind of acting as a firewall







  • It depends on the registrar. By the rules of icann:

    At least annually, a registrar must present to the registrant the current Whois information, and remind the registrant that provision of false Whois information can be grounds for cancellation of their domain name registration. Registrants must review their Whois data, and make any corrections.

    So if the FBI concludes that the provided WHOIS data is false, they could potentially still use that as reason to seize the domains





  • Are there existing tools you love (or hate) that do something similar?

    This sounds similar to “Static code analysis” tools. Especially now that these code analysis tools are getting AI integrations.

    For example we use coderabbit.ai. That does a code review on PRs in github, and reviews these sort of things. Especially the simpler things that you’ve mentioned like poor naming conventions, violations of language-specific best practices, and readability issues. I’m not sure if it will automatically come up with “large refactoring opportunities” by default - but maybe you can custom-prompt configure it to try, I guess

    (Comment) Why have a separate webpage if such of helper can be built into IDE/editor?

    Coderabbit also has IDE extensions: https://www.coderabbit.ai/ide - I think the separate webpage exists for org level configurations and overviews. These “best practices” are probably defined on a team level to ensure everyone uses the same code-style and things like that

    I’m not sure if “just a website to copypaste code and get reviews” is really a good idea. Maybe for juniors that want to review one class or method or something. But usually code is spread across multiple files, and structural refactor opportunities are on a larger scale then just a couple files


  • On September 19, Ruby Central, a nonprofit organization that manages RubyGems.org, a platform for sharing Ruby code and libraries, asserted control over several GitHub repositories for Ruby Gems as well as other critical Ruby open source projects that the rest of the Ruby development community relies on.

    Uhm, so how does this happen? If some people create Ruby Gems and host them under their own github account, how would Ruby Central suddenly assert control over them?