Patrick Breyer (@echo_pbreyer@digitalcourage.social)
digitalcourage.social
Angehängt: 1 Bild 🇬🇧Leak on latest #ChatControl attempt (in German): https://netzpolitik.org/2024/interne-dokumente-sperrminoritaet-gegen-chatkontrolle-wackelt/ +++ Only AUT, DEU, EST, LUX, POL, SVN were critical – no blocking minority! +++ BEL, CZE, FIN, ITA, NLD, PRT, SWE undecided +++ EU legal experts confirm violation of our fundamental rights +++ Only 5 days to next discussion +++ Help pressure our governments into defending our #privacy of correspondence and secure #encryption now: https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/take-action-to-stop-chat-control-now/

Leak on latest #ChatControl attempt (in German): https://netzpolitik.org/2024/interne-dokumente-sperrminoritaet-gegen-chatkontrolle-wackelt/ +++ Only AUT, DEU, EST, LUX, POL, SVN were critical – no blocking minority! +++ BEL, CZE, FIN, ITA, NLD, PRT, SWE undecided +++ EU legal experts confirm violation of our fundamental rights +++ Only 5 days to next discussion +++

Help pressure our governments into defending our #privacy of correspondence and secure #encryption now: https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/take-action-to-stop-chat-control-now/

  • memphis@feddit.orgEnglish
    13·
    1 month ago

    Translation of parts from the German netzpolitik.org article:

    […] For over two years, the Commission has wanted to oblige internet services to scan the content of their users for criminal offenses and send it to the authorities in the event of suspicion. For almost a year now, the Parliament has described this as mass surveillance and has called for only unencrypted content of suspects to be scanned. […] The EU Commission demands that internet services scan their users’ content for three types of criminal content: known child pornography, new material and grooming. For known material, there are established systems for matching unencrypted content with hashes. This technology alone has been criticized. […] A majority of states also agree with the new proposal.

    Ten states even emphasize that “the current proposal has reached the limit of their willingness to compromise”. […]

    The EU Commission emphasizes that its draft law and the current proposal also cover encrypted content. The Commission believes it is “still necessary to have the possibility of detection in encrypted communications” - i.e. to override encryption. […]

    Other states also reject the current proposal. Six states "stated that they could not agree to the proposal due to fundamental concerns.

    […]

    The Legal Service of the EU member states supports the critics. Last year, the experts came to the conclusion that chat control is contrary to fundamental rights and will fail in court. These concerns have “still not been dispelled”. The lawyers also believe “that the proposal would not stand up to judicial review” - i.e. it is illegal.

    […] If either France or Italy - or two states from the Netherlands, Belgium and the Czech Republic - reject the new proposal, there will still be no majority in the Council.

    […] The Hungarian Council Presidency is sticking to its optimistic timetable. Hungary actually wanted to “further negotiate the proposal at a technical level”. That would be the Council working group on criminal prosecution. It met today, but did not discuss the chat control. Instead, the advisors for justice and home affairs are to negotiate the Hungarian proposal on Monday. If Hungary has its way, the Permanent Representatives will then decide on the Council’s position, followed by the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers on October 10. France and Sweden are “explicitly” in favor.