Comrades!

It seems like maybe something happened to @Vampire@hexbear.net and so, in the interim I guess someone needs to post the thread so we can all discuss. Feel free to suggest changes here, I’m not trying to assume I know what the plan was, just trying to keep us going until they return.

Archives: Week 1 – Week 2 – Week 3 – Week 4 – Week 5 – Week 6 – Week 7 – Week 8 – Week 9 – Week 10 – Week 11 – Week 12 – Week 13 – Week 14 – Week 15 – Week 16 – Week 17 – Week 18 – Week 19 – Week 20 – Week 21 – Week 22 – Week 23 – Week 24 – Week 25 – Week 26 – Week 27 – Week 28 – Week 29 – Week 30 – Week 31 – Week 32 – Week 33 – Week 34 – Week 35 – Week 36 – Week 37 – Week 38 – Week 39 – Week 40 – Week 41

I think it may be wise to talk about how to proceed in the event that something prevents their speedy return, obviously we’re not giving up this late in the game so a plan-B for going forward is probably for the best.

Feel free to delete or replace this when you return, Vampire, and I salute you for your effort all year to keep us going.

As far as discussion, there wasn’t a post for last week, so if anyone has thoughts on bank capital (I read 29-31, it seemed about the right length) I’d be happy to hear them. I’m doing 32-33 this week, I dunno if that’s too short but adding 34 made it seem really long.

If it seems like I have the pacing off I can change that, just let me know.

  • Beaver [he/him]@hexbear.netEnglish
    3·
    14 days ago

    From chapter 29:

    To the extent that the depreciation or increase in value of this paper is independent of the movement of value of the actual capital that it represents, the wealth of the nation is just as great before as after its depreciation or increase in value.

    “The public stocks and canal and railway shares had already by the 23rd of October, 1847, been depreciated in the aggregate to the amount of £114,752,225.” (Morris, Governor of the Bank of England, testimony in the Report on Commercial Distress, 1847-48 [No. 3800].)

    Unless this depreciation reflected an actual stoppage of production and of traffic on canals and railways, or a suspension of already initiated enterprises, or squandering capital in positively worthless ventures, the nation did not grow one cent poorer by the bursting of this soap bubble of nominal money-capital.

    All this paper actually represents nothing more than accumulated claims, or legal titles, to future production whose money or capital value represents either no capital at all, as in the case of state debts, or is regulated independently of the value of real capital which it represents.

    It seems like such a completely obvious point that you shouldn’t even have to make it. But in the 150 years since this was written, the financial press have not stopped talking about the speculative value of paper as if it was entirely 1 to 1 equivalent to actual existing productive capital.