Putin Promotes 'Self-Sacrifice' in Russian Schools to Fight Ukraine
knewz.com
Vladimir Putin’s government is urging Russian children to engage in “self-sacrifice” and build guns as the fighting in Ukraine lengthens.

Putin signed a law in August creating a new required course in “Fundamentals of Security and Defense of the Motherland.”

In July, the defense ministry approved high school-age lessons on how to operate assault rifles, combat drones and hand grenades. They will be introduced across Russia next year.

Barbieri believes the drone lessons are in response to Ukraine’s extensive use of drones to disrupt and damage Russian locations.

At younger ages, children as young as seven are learning how to assemble machine guns.

    • tal@kbin.social
      5·
      1 year ago

      Maybe. I don’t think that the war is necessarily the main concern.

      Hitler consumed all of his fighting-age men, and then had to use what he had left, which were the youth and elderly. That’s not the situation in the Russo-Ukrainian War, not by a long shot.

      The Kremlin is very probably concerned about the political effects of mobilization. Mobilization was delayed well past the point where it was probably militarily-advisory, and the Kremlin was willing to pay a lot to bring in contract soldiers to try to limit mobilization. That’s not a government that’s exhausted all available manpower and is looking for stop-gap measures to try to convert more people into military power. It’s a state that’s worried about what the conflict might do to the government politically.

      The Kim dynasty stayed in power in North Korea for a long time by keeping the country in a constant state of alert and militarizing society.

      https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/perpetual-struggle-why-korean-war-did-not-end-north-korea-164209

      The Political Motives of Sustaining a Perpetual War

      While often—yet mistakenly—called the forgotten war, to both North and South Koreans the Korean War is not some distant memory, but has become an integral part of their respective national identity. In North Korea, the discourse on the Korean War is among the most important meta-narratives that make use of the country’s foundational history and recurring historical analogies to explain and legitimize contemporary their government. According to this narrative, the Korean War did not end in 1953 and while the nature of this conflict changed over time, the logic of a perpetual national emergency has been kept intact.

      Even in times of political détente, the discursive construction of a permanent threat by and perpetual war with the United States was largely upheld in the domestic discourse. Described as a “diplomatic war” in many North Korean sources, diplomacy with America is described as continuation of war by other means. Understanding the reason behind this logic requires us to acknowledge that, to the decisionmakers in Pyongyang, sustaining a state of perpetual war and supreme emergency serves a number of tangible political functions. For instance, most notably to strengthen collective identity by provoking and allaying anxiety to maintain quiescence and de-legitimizing dissent. As the identity of the Self is experienced and apprehended more strongly in times of increased threats and the existence of an external enemy, these notions are frequently used to build internal unity and coherency.

      Selig Harrison rightly stated that North Korea’s “permanent siege mentality” has not only helped bonding the society (and the political class) together, but that the permanent state of supreme emergency is also a powerful political strategy that helped solidify the rule of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and now Kim Jong-un. As the leader is basically equated with the sovereignty and independence of the North Korean state and the protection of the Korean nation, the production of an identity as a warring nation reinforces a strong need to preserve the absolute nature of its leader.

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Songun

      Songun is the “military-first” policy of North Korea, prioritizing the Korean People’s Army in the affairs of state and allocation of resources. “Military-first” as a principle guides political and economic life in North Korea, with “military-first politics” dominating the political system; “a line of military-first economic construction” acting as an economic system; and “military-first ideology” serving as the guiding ideology.

      Songun elevates the Korean People’s Army within North Korea as an organization and as a state function, granting it the primary position in the North Korean government and society. It guides domestic policy and international interactions.[1] It is the framework for the government, designating the military as the “supreme repository of power”. The government grants the Korean People’s Army the highest economic and resource-allocation priority and positions it as the model for society to emulate.[2] Songun is also the ideological concept behind a shift in policies since 1994 which emphasize the people’s military over all other aspects of state and society.

      [continued in child]

      • tal@kbin.social
        4·
        1 year ago

        [continued from parent]

        There’s a name given to a limited-duration effect seen in the US where, under certain conditions, US Presidents get a short-term spike in popularity during military conflicts. That’s not a very long-lasting effect, but it is quite dramatic in strength – if the public considers the country to be at risk, they will tend to put aside political differences and support the current leadership.

        https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rally_'round_the_flag_effect

        The rally 'round the flag effect (or syndrome) is a concept used in political science and international relations to explain increased short-run popular support of a country’s government or political leaders during periods of international crisis or war.[1] Because the effect can reduce criticism of governmental policies, it can be seen as a factor of diversionary foreign policy.[1]

        But suppose that instead of a short-term effect because of a temporary conflict, you can have a country – from a domestic political standpoint, at any rate, no or little actual fighting required – staying in a permanent, wartime crisis mode. Then maybe you can leverage the effect on an ongoing basis. North Korea has, rarely, had limited and small conflicts with South Korea subsequent to the Korean War. If it did initiate a second annexation attempt, it would likely go poorly for North Korea. It is not likely, as things stand, to initiate a second attempt. But by keeping the country politically at a state of war…well, you can still maintain control when, by most respects, North Korea’s situation isn’t all that great for the typical person in North Korea. The Kim dynasty is quite politically-repressive, and the country has about three percent the per-capita GDP of South Korea. That’s ordinarily a situation where people are likely going to ask some difficult questions of the government. But as long as, from a political standpoint, the country is at war…shrugs

        Russia in 2023 is more-politically-repressive than it was, say, ten years back, but it’s also still no North Korea. But I have wondered whether it might be the case that the Kremlin winds up trying to leverage some of the same mechanisms that the Kim dynasty does.