Here’s the more constructive part of the (I still think warranted - but likely a bit tone deaf) rant: https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/pull/181

@Alexstarfire@lemmy.world I sure did. I also renamed the variable to a name that makes its existence obvious to anyone reading the code.

The code originally made a copy of a struct before modifying the copy. The original was then used afterwards. I entirely missed the later use and that it was critical that the original struct was used as is. So I passed a subtly modified struct to the later processing, which, in combination with a second bug I had introduced some time earlier, caused all kinds of havoc.

There was another bug I also introduced, which funnily had similar effects. This bug was added months ago, and it affected only older OS versions. I typically only run the bleeding version during development (but I had tested the change with older versions, too). Unfortunately, this issue was random as it depended on stack contents to get triggered, and thus went unnoticed until the additional scrutiny introduced this intense debugging session.

The combination of these factors made this highly frustrating thing to debug, as any kind of A-B testing fails when you have multiple or random issues.

#bugstories

@jerry It largely depends on how well the initial impact is cleaned up. I’m hoping we won’t see a ton of backdoors in various components next.

The httpget 0.2 doesn’t quite work in the form it was uploaded.

First it uses hardcoded argv, argc instead of getting from the app invocation (as args in main, the code uses void main).

Second obtaining any data from the socket will result in the app stopping and leaving behind an empty file (if (nread) break;).

This program could never download anything. It is likely some work in progress or modified test version of httpget. Since it includes some windows specific headers and has disabled the unix ones I can only presume it was some earlier attempt to get the tool running on windows.

So while the code has a local stack buffer overflow it can’t be triggered for this early version.

If this trend continues, we will be losing the ability to use secure means of communication with UK friends and colleagues. For example, #signalapp will rather get out of the UK than add backdoors: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-64584001

“#Nordnet admits that it was possible to trade in other people’s depots during the IT breakdown”

https://www.marketscreener.com/quote/stock/NORDNET-AB-115787339/news/Nordnet-admits-that-it-was-possible-to-trade-in-other-people-s-depots-during-the-IT-breakdown-49034492/

#Nordnet services appear to be back.

Nordnet has a lot of technical issues to sort out. If the malfunction allowed unauthorized parties to operate the accounts it will be quite messy to sort out.

Among with technical part, they will have to deal with the regulatory issues, in particular the Financial Supervisory Authority. They will demand answers.

I still occasionally write some m68k code and apps. These are from 2024:

- Execute code in #amiga color registers: https://sintonen.fi/src/colexec/colexec.asm
- RXS-M-XS 32bit->32bit Permuted Congruential Generator: https://sintonen.fi/src/misc/pcg/_rand.asm
- Minimal modplayer (protracker music player): https://sintonen.fi/src/minimod/ (the replayer routine is mostly from Frank Wille however)

I also participated in very useless size/speedcoding competitions - some of them are still accessible from this old web page: https://amycoders.org/compo/

Note that some of the HTML is a bit broken, for example https://amycoders.org/compo/circlecompo.html - you can view source to see the full routine

#m68k #assembly #sizecoding #speedcoding

@SatyrSack@feddit.org Curl will likely address this eventually even though they don’t consider it a vulnerability. See https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/16197

The latest curl version 8.12.0 (released today) is affected.

The details of the #AMD Microcode Signature Verification #Vulnerability are out:

• https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3019.html
• https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-4xq7-4mgh-gp6w

#infosec #infosecurity #cybersecurity

So what could you do if the microcode signature verification can be bypassed? While not directly applicable, this #defcon presentation “DEF CON 31 - Backdoor in the Core - Altering Intel x86 Instruction Set at Runtime - Krog, Skovsende” gives some ideas: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zda7yMbbW7s

@gabrielesvelto Yeah, information for that vulnerability is non-existent as well. In all the vulnerability management doesn’t seem to be going great here.

Update: The “PeCoffLoader memory overflow issue for security” likely is CVE-2024-38796: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2024-38796

I had actually forgotten I still had Docker installed on this system. I’ve now fixed this issue by uninstalling the malicious app. I’m using #podman elsewhere already, just had this install lingering still. Apple: Thanks for the warning!

@g@irrelephant.co Oof, that’s not good at all.

@screaminggoat@infosec.exchange Yep, that’s the one.

@jgrg Oops, it’s u-z. Corrected the post now, thanks for pointing that out.