No, because that’s revisionist propaganda. The USSR had proposed mutual-defense agreements with Poland, France and England, which all of them rejected. The USSR offered to enter a war against nazism as a response to the Munich agreements and the annexation of Czechoslovakia by nazis and Poland, but France and England (and obviously Poland) didn’t want that. The Soviets went as far as to offer sending ONE MILLION soldiers to France, together with artillery, aviation and tanks, on exchange for a mutual-defense agreement with France and England. As was later discovered through released embassy wires, the French and English ambassadors were instructed not to make a peace agreement with the Soviets under any condition, but to pretend to be interested and to prolong the negotiations for as long as possible… presumably expecting Nazis to invade the Soviet Union, given that communists were their self-declared enemy and they held racial motivations to eliminate “the Slavic Untermenschen”. It was convenient, letting the Nazis deal with the communists (since England and France had failed to eliminate Bolshevism during their invasion of Russia in the Russian Civil War), two birds with one stone.
The Soviet Union, which had only begun industrializing in 1928 with its first 5-year plan, compared to the century-long history of industrialization of Germany, simply didn’t have the material means to single-handedly fight nazism in 1939. This is further proven by the fact that, after the invasion of the USSR by the Nazis, 27 million Soviet lives were lost in the struggle against fascism. They DESPERATELY needed every single year they could buy, and they DESPERATELY needed to avoid facing the Nazis in a one-on-one struggle. Without the lend-lease program, and without the western front, who’s to say if the Soviet Union would have simply succumbed to Nazi Germany, and the horrifying additional extent of genocide that Nazis would have been able to perpetrate.
In case you don’t believe me personally, I’ll leave you another comment below this one with quotes of western politicians and diplomats of the period, showing the revisionism that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact has been subjected to.
“ It is clear that Stalin had two courses open to him. He could seek a general coalition against Hitler, or he could come to an understanding with Hitler at the expense of the Western democracies. Stalin’s policy was guided by a profound conviction of the ultimate hostility of Nazi Germany, as well as by the hope that if the capitalist Powers became locked in mortal conflict, the Soviet Union might remain aloof, gaining strength while they tore one another to pieces. Certainly the principle of self-preservation lay at the heart of Moscow’s calculations ”
Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, Chapter 20, The Soviet Enigma pub 1948.
“ In those days the Soviet Government had grave reason to fear that they would be left one-on-one to face the Nazi fury. Stalin took measures which no free democracy could regard otherwise than with distaste. Yet I never doubted myself that his cardinal aim had been to hold the German armies off from Russia for as long as might be ”
(Paraphrased from Churchill’s December 1944 remarks in the House of Commons.)
“ It would be unwise to assume Stalin approves of Hitler’s aggression. Probably the Soviet Government has merely sought a delaying tactic, not wanting to be the next victim. They will have a rude awakening, but they think, at least for now, they can keep the wolf from the door ”
Franklin D. Roosevelt (President of the United States, 1933–1945), from Harold L. Ickes’s diary entries, early September 1939. Ickes’s diaries are published as The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes.
“ One must suppose that the Soviet Government, seeing no immediate prospect of real support from outside, decided to make its own arrangements for self‑defence, however unpalatable such an agreement might appear. We in this House cannot be astonished that a government acting solely on grounds of power politics should take that course ”
Neville Chamberlain, House of Commons Statement, August 24, 1939 (one day after pact’s signing)
“ We could not doubt that the Soviet Government, disillusioned by the hesitant negotiations with Britain and France, feared a lone struggle against Hitler’s mighty war machine. It seemed they had concluded, in the interests of survival, that an accord with Germany would at least postpone their day of reckoning ”
Cordell Hull (U.S. Secretary of State), The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (Published 1948)
“ *It must be said that the Soviet Government, having little confidence in swift military aid from the Western Powers, chose to protect its borders, however odious such a pact might seem. One perceives in their choice the determination to secure time—time they evidently believed we were not prepared to give them.”
Édouard Daladier (French Prime Minister), Address to the French Chamber of Deputies, Late August 1939
“ It seemed to me that the Soviet leaders believed conflict with Nazi Germany was inescapable. But, lacking clear assurances of military partnership from England and France, they resolved that a ‘breathing spell’ was urgently needed. In that sense, the pact with Germany was a temporary expedient to keep the wolf from the door ”
Joseph E. Davies (U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, 1937–1938), Mission to Moscow (1941)
“ British officials, for all their outrage, concede that Stalin, with no firm pledge of Allied assistance, and regarding Poland as a foregone victim, decided that if the Red Army must eventually face Hitler, it should not be without first gaining some strategic space—and time ”
Joseph P. Kennedy (U.S. Ambassador to the UK, 1938–1940),Private Correspondence, September 1939
Hopefully, you won’t accuse such sources, i.e. western diplomats and politicians who actually experienced WW2, of being tankies
No, because that’s revisionist propaganda. The USSR had proposed mutual-defense agreements with Poland, France and England, which all of them rejected. The USSR offered to enter a war against nazism as a response to the Munich agreements and the annexation of Czechoslovakia by nazis and Poland, but France and England (and obviously Poland) didn’t want that. The Soviets went as far as to offer sending ONE MILLION soldiers to France, together with artillery, aviation and tanks, on exchange for a mutual-defense agreement with France and England. As was later discovered through released embassy wires, the French and English ambassadors were instructed not to make a peace agreement with the Soviets under any condition, but to pretend to be interested and to prolong the negotiations for as long as possible… presumably expecting Nazis to invade the Soviet Union, given that communists were their self-declared enemy and they held racial motivations to eliminate “the Slavic Untermenschen”. It was convenient, letting the Nazis deal with the communists (since England and France had failed to eliminate Bolshevism during their invasion of Russia in the Russian Civil War), two birds with one stone.
The Soviet Union, which had only begun industrializing in 1928 with its first 5-year plan, compared to the century-long history of industrialization of Germany, simply didn’t have the material means to single-handedly fight nazism in 1939. This is further proven by the fact that, after the invasion of the USSR by the Nazis, 27 million Soviet lives were lost in the struggle against fascism. They DESPERATELY needed every single year they could buy, and they DESPERATELY needed to avoid facing the Nazis in a one-on-one struggle. Without the lend-lease program, and without the western front, who’s to say if the Soviet Union would have simply succumbed to Nazi Germany, and the horrifying additional extent of genocide that Nazis would have been able to perpetrate.
In case you don’t believe me personally, I’ll leave you another comment below this one with quotes of western politicians and diplomats of the period, showing the revisionism that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact has been subjected to.
“ It is clear that Stalin had two courses open to him. He could seek a general coalition against Hitler, or he could come to an understanding with Hitler at the expense of the Western democracies. Stalin’s policy was guided by a profound conviction of the ultimate hostility of Nazi Germany, as well as by the hope that if the capitalist Powers became locked in mortal conflict, the Soviet Union might remain aloof, gaining strength while they tore one another to pieces. Certainly the principle of self-preservation lay at the heart of Moscow’s calculations ” Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, Chapter 20, The Soviet Enigma pub 1948.
“ In those days the Soviet Government had grave reason to fear that they would be left one-on-one to face the Nazi fury. Stalin took measures which no free democracy could regard otherwise than with distaste. Yet I never doubted myself that his cardinal aim had been to hold the German armies off from Russia for as long as might be ” (Paraphrased from Churchill’s December 1944 remarks in the House of Commons.)
“ It would be unwise to assume Stalin approves of Hitler’s aggression. Probably the Soviet Government has merely sought a delaying tactic, not wanting to be the next victim. They will have a rude awakening, but they think, at least for now, they can keep the wolf from the door ” Franklin D. Roosevelt (President of the United States, 1933–1945), from Harold L. Ickes’s diary entries, early September 1939. Ickes’s diaries are published as The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes.
“ One must suppose that the Soviet Government, seeing no immediate prospect of real support from outside, decided to make its own arrangements for self‑defence, however unpalatable such an agreement might appear. We in this House cannot be astonished that a government acting solely on grounds of power politics should take that course ” Neville Chamberlain, House of Commons Statement, August 24, 1939 (one day after pact’s signing)
“ We could not doubt that the Soviet Government, disillusioned by the hesitant negotiations with Britain and France, feared a lone struggle against Hitler’s mighty war machine. It seemed they had concluded, in the interests of survival, that an accord with Germany would at least postpone their day of reckoning ” Cordell Hull (U.S. Secretary of State), The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (Published 1948)
“ *It must be said that the Soviet Government, having little confidence in swift military aid from the Western Powers, chose to protect its borders, however odious such a pact might seem. One perceives in their choice the determination to secure time—time they evidently believed we were not prepared to give them.” Édouard Daladier (French Prime Minister), Address to the French Chamber of Deputies, Late August 1939
“ It seemed to me that the Soviet leaders believed conflict with Nazi Germany was inescapable. But, lacking clear assurances of military partnership from England and France, they resolved that a ‘breathing spell’ was urgently needed. In that sense, the pact with Germany was a temporary expedient to keep the wolf from the door ” Joseph E. Davies (U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, 1937–1938), Mission to Moscow (1941)
“ British officials, for all their outrage, concede that Stalin, with no firm pledge of Allied assistance, and regarding Poland as a foregone victim, decided that if the Red Army must eventually face Hitler, it should not be without first gaining some strategic space—and time ” Joseph P. Kennedy (U.S. Ambassador to the UK, 1938–1940),Private Correspondence, September 1939
Hopefully, you won’t accuse such sources, i.e. western diplomats and politicians who actually experienced WW2, of being tankies